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ABSTRACT
The Common Law, parliamentary democracy, and academia all institutionalize dissent to check undue
obedience to authority; and corporate governance reformers advocate the same in boardrooms. Many
corporate governance disasters could often be averted if directors asked hard questions, demanded
clear answers, and blew whistles. Work by Milgram suggests humans have an innate predisposition
to obey authority. This excessive subservience of agent to principal, here dubbed a "type II agency
problem", explains directors’ eerie submission. Rational explanations are reviewed, but behavioral
explanations appear more complete. Experimental work shows this predisposition disrupted by dissenting
peers, conflicting authorities, and distant authorities. Thus, independent directors, chairs, and committees
excluding CEOs might induce greater rationality and more considered ethics in corporate governance.
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Loyalty means nothing unless it has at its heart the absolute principle of self-sacrifice. 
Woodrow T. Wilson 
Introduction 
Misplaced loyalty lies at the heart of numerous recent scandals in corporate governance. 
Corporate officers and directors, who should have known better, put loyalty to a dynamic Chief 
Executive Officer above duty to shareholders and obedience to the law. The officers and directors 
of Enron, Worldcom, Hollinger, and almost every other allegedly misgoverned firm could have 
asked questions, demanded answers, and blown whistles, but did not. Ultimately they sacrificed 
their careers and reputations for their CEOs.  
Loyalty is an important virtue. It makes possible the large hierarchical organizations that 
underpin national economies: armies, government bureaucracies, political parties and 
corporations. But loyalty – to political ideologues, religious zealots, ethnic purists, and other 
militants – also underlies the most horrific chapters in history books.
1 Corporate  governance 
scandals are minor misdemeanors in this company, but the underlying problem of misplaced 
loyalty is the same.  
  Much work in empirical social psychology suggests that loyalty is hardwired into human 
behavior. Milgram (1963, 1974) shows that a human subject suppresses internal ethical standards 
surprisingly readily if these conflict with loyalty to an authority figure. This accords well with 
officers and directors’ stalwart loyalty to misguided or errant CEOs, even under clear signs of 
impending financial doom. Milgram argues that loyal behavior stimulates feelings of well-being, 
and that this reflects evolutionary pressure on early human societies, when obedience to authority 
wrought social organization that raised survival odds (Hobbes, 1652).  
  In the modern world, more nuanced obedience to authority may be required. Corporate 
governance reformers, in particular, seek to weaken this innate response at selective points in 
corporate hierarchies. Milgram (1974) finds that dissenting peers and rival authorities undermine  3
subjects’ loyalty, and stimulate independent moral reasoning. Corporate governance reforms that 
envision independent directors (dissenting peers) and non-executive chairs (alternative authority 
figures) aspire to a similar effect on corporate boards – a fostering of debate to expose flawed 
policies before they become lethal - and thereby render corporate governance disasters rarer. In 
this vein, the Higgs Report proposes that listed company boards in the United Kingdom have 
non-executive chairs and senior independent directors, and the Sarbanes Oxley reforms in the 
United States require that boards contain enough independent directors to staff key board 
committees.  
  In light of these findings from social psychology, the inability of economics and finance 
to detect consistent linkages between board independence and corporate performance is 
puzzling.
2 There are two plausible reasons for this.  
One is that insufficient time has elapsed to show the effects of active independent 
directors. Many of the directors classified as independent in corporate proxy statements may in 
fact be deeply beholden to the CEO. The Higgs report finds that almost half the so-called 
independent directors on British boards were recruited by the CEO through personal contacts or 
friendships. A mere four percent had a formal interview. This renders nominally independent 
directors beholden to CEOs. As more stringent definitions of independence apply, a clearer 
relationship with firm performance may emerge. 
A second plausible reason is that behavioral constraints on board independence are deep. 
Deeper reforms, like letting institutional investors and public shareholders nominate candidates 
for elections to boards, may thus be needed to foster genuinely independent directors and board 
chairs. Institutional investors too are only tenuously linked to firm performance. This may reflect 
governance problems within institutional investors (Lakonishok et al. 1992) or their inability at 
present to affect many boards.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 See e.g. Laski (1919).  
2 See e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a recent survey.   4
More generally, behavioral arguments, heretofore restricted within finance to explaining 
asset pricing anomalies (Shleifer, 1999; Baker and Wurgler, 2007), may illuminate issues in other 
branches of financial economics, such as corporate governance.
3  
 
The Milgram Experiment 
The first empirical evidence for an innate loyalty response in human behavior is a series of social 
psychology experiments begun in1961 by Stanley Milgram (1963, 1974), then an Assistant 
Professor of psychology at Yale (Blass, 2004). Milgram constructed a box, depicted in Figure 1, 
featuring electric switches labeled “15 volts”, “30 volts”, “45 volts”, and so on up to “450 volts”. 
The voltages were also labeled with terms ranging from “slight” through “very strong” to 
“extreme intensity”, “danger severe”, and “XXX”. Wires led from this box to various parts of the 
body of a professional actor, the “learner” shown in Figure 1B, who was paid to feign 
increasingly painful electrocution as the real subject of the experiment threw switches marked 
with increasing voltages. The box contained a noise maker to mimic the buzz of surging electric 
currents.  
  Each subject was told (falsely) that the “learner” was the subject of the experiment and 
asked to assist the experimenter. The purpose of the experiment was explained as studying “the 
effects of punishment on learning and memory.” The real subjects of the experiment were 
ordinary citizens of New Haven, CT. attracted by advertisements of cash for participation in 
psychology experiments. The subjects thus felt a financial obligation to Milgram as well as a 
sense of participating in important research at a leading university. Milgram wore a lab coat to 
impress this image.  
                                                           
3 A large strategy literature posits behavioral regularities in boardrooms.  For example Westphal and Stern 
(2006, 2007) and references therein demonstrate networking effects in director selection.  Behavioral 
explanations of governance issues also enter the finance literature – e.g.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) on 
merger waves, Baker et al. (2007) on capital spending, and others.      5
  The subject was told he or she would serve as a “teacher”, and was seated before the 
panel of switches. The “learner” was asked a series of questions, to which he sometimes gave 
incorrect answers. Each time this occurred, the “teacher” was to apply a larger electric shock to 
the actor, who feigned increasing pain. Milgram (1974, p. 4) describes the actor’s script: “At 75 
volts, the “learner” grunts. At 120 volts he complains verbally; at 150 he demands to be released 
from the experiment. His protests continue as the shocks escalate, growing increasingly vehement 
and emotional. At 285 volts his response can only be described as an agonized scream.”  
Figure 1. The Experimental Design  
The setup in Stanley Milgram’s original obedience experiments at Yale University in the 
early 1960s.  
  
     
Panel A. The bogus shock 
generator contains a buzzer 
and has wires running to the 
“teacher’s” seat.  
Panel B. The “teacher” (real 
experimental subject) helps 
strap in the “learner” (actor) 
and apply bogus electrodes 
Panel C. The teacher is 
taught to operate the bogus 
shock generator  
 
Source: Milgram (1974). 
 
  Milgram initially believed most Americans would quickly break off from the experiment. 
He initially intended to replicate the procedure in Germany to see if there was a cultural 
difference that might explain the widespread complicity of ordinary Germans in wartime 
atrocities. Milgram was astonished at the results of a “test run”, in which Yale students dutifully 
electrocuted perfect strangers when told to do so. Milgram dismissed the results as the behavior 
of “Yalies”.  
  But the full fledged experiment, using ordinary Americans, generated similar results. 
Ordinary Americans seem perfectly willing to send high voltage electric shocks through a 
complete stranger if ordered to do so by an authority figure.   6
  Figure 2 summarizes the results of the Milgram experiment. One hundred percent of 
ordinary Americans are willing to send electric shocks through an experimental subject, up 
through 135 volts, when the “learner” demands to be released. At that point, about twenty percent 
stop obeying. Eighty percent of Americans continue administering shocks labeled “very strong” 
and “intense”, up through two hundred and eighty-five volts, when the “learner” begins 
screaming in agony. A bit over sixty percent of ordinary Americans obediently administer electric 
shocks all the way up to four hundred and fifty volts, despite labels like “extreme intensity”, 
“danger severe”, and “XXX” next to the voltage figures on the control panel.  
  The Milgram experiment has been replicated many times in many countries, including 
Germany - see Miller (1986) and Blass (1998, 2000) for a review of this literature; and Merritt 
and Helmreich (1996), Tarnow (2000), and others for other related work - and has been replicated 
by this author. Its generality as a description of human nature is now beyond doubt.  
 
Figure 2. Obedience Rates, Basic Milgram Experiment 
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents who directed high voltage electric shocks 
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Source: Milgram (1974).   7
Milgram repeated the experiment varying several parameters. For example, he found no 
difference in between male and female subjects. Moving the experiment from New Haven to 
Bridgeport had little effect. Placing the “learner” (actor) in more direct proximity to the “teacher” 
(true subject) did reduce obedience, but only marginally.  
Milgram was so appalled by his findings that he never repeated the experiment in 
Germany. He concluded instead that human have a built-in propensity for loyalty – an urge to 
obey authority (Blass, 2004).  
  Milgram (1974) suggests that this urge has a genetic basis. Pre-human and early human 
hunters and gatherers who fell into line behind a tribal chief may well have had a significant 
survival advantage over otherwise biologically identical species composed of isolated individuals. 
Animals that hunt in packs, like wolves, also sort themselves into hierarchies, headed by so-called 
alpha males. Chimpanzees and Great Apes also spontaneously form hierarchies of dominance. 
Milgram’s hypothesis that an analogous genetic impulse affects certain aspects of human 
behavior seems plausible, though little is actually known of its biochemical or genetic basis. 
Certainly, the hypothesis accords with early work in political economy, such as Hobbes (1652), 
arguing that submission to organized tyranny is preferable to independent savagery. Regardless, 
that we have built-in positive feelings associated with obedience to authority goes far to explain 
much of the misery and atrocity overlaying human history.
4 We feel a sense of satisfaction from 
self-sacrificing acts of loyalty so profound that an innate biological basis seems likely.  
  Milgram followed up with the subjects of his experiments to understand why they 
behaved as they did (Blass, 2004). Many were profoundly upset by the experience, but common 
themes subjects used in justifying their actions were that they “gave their word” to the 
experimenter or felt a sense of “loyalty”. Many indicated that they were “doing what was 
expected of them”. Others indicated that failing to “live up to the expectations” of the 
                                                           
4 See Bernardo and Welch (2001) for a discussion of group selection inducing seemingly irrational 
individual behavior in economics.   8
experimenter was less acceptable than administering the shocks. Self-perceptions of “duty” and 
“loyalty” seemed to induce positive feelings and this promoted obedience. Since similar deep 
emotional responses are associated with other basic instinctive drives, Milgram’s postulate of a 
neurological basis for obedience to authority seems plausible.  
 
Leadership and Corporate Governance 
In a modern liberal democracy, corporate head offices are prominent arenas for unfettered 
“leadership”. Politicians are restrained by checks and balances and subject to the discipline of 
party whips. Judges are subject to reversal, bound by codes or precedent, and restrained by rules 
of procedure. But corporate CEOs can exercise leadership robustly. Short of violating the law, 
they can run their firms as they like. They can hire and fire lower level managers as they please, 
direct investment where they wish, and organize and reorganize their companies as they like.  
  Ideally, when a CEO proposes actions or strategies that are manifestly wrongheaded, 
experts in relevant fields should step forward to correct the error, or at least raise questions. But 
such people might be given pause by motion picture mogul Samuel Goldwyn’s famous bluster, “I 
don’t want any yes-men around me! I want everyone to tell me the truth – even if it costs him his 
job!”  
  The board’s explicit purpose is to hire, monitor, and – if necessary – fire the CEO. 
Corporate officers and directors in the United States have a formal fiduciary duty to intervene as 
necessary to protect public shareholders. That includes scaling back the CEO’s pay if 
performance flags and firing seriously underperforming CEOs. But Mace (1986) shows that 
directors remain steadfastly loyal to misguided CEOs. The directors of Enron, WorldCom, 
Hollinger, Parmalat, and all the other companies currently embroiled in scandal attended regular 
meetings to favorably assess the performance of their CEOs. Despite increasing attention being  9
drawn to their legal and ethical responsibilities, directors seem paralyzed in the presence of 
powerful CEOs.  
  To social psychologists, this paralysis is not surprising. Like the subjects who felt duty-
bound to administer high voltage electric shocks to perfect strangers, directors often feel an 
allegiance to the CEO. Criticizing a CEO, even for palpably awful decisions, smacks of 
“disloyalty”. Such a feeling is apparently to be avoided, even at considerable cost to one’s 
conscience. Just as the “teacher” felt a need to meet the experimenter’s expectations and 
electrocute the “learner”, directors may feel a need to “live up to” a hubristic CEO’s expectations 
and condone harm to public shareholders. 
Figure 3. Variant Experimental Designs 
When the “teacher” was required to hold the “learner’s” hands against metal plates to 
administer the shock, obedience rates declined somewhat. At higher voltages, the “learner”, 




     Source:  Milgram  (1974).   
 
Why do directors’ feelings of loyalty to the CEO outweigh their legal duty of loyalty to 
public shareholders? Public shareholders, the vulnerable widows and orphans of financial lore, 
are not present in the boardroom. Save one day each year, the annual general meeting, public 
shareholders are remote abstractions. Milgram found “teachers” more willing to administer 
shocks to more remotely located subjects – seated around a corner or in an adjacent room – than 
to subjects sitting nearer by. Figure 3 depicts a “close proximity” variant of the experiment, in  10
which the “teacher” had to hold the “learner’s” hands against metal plates while administering the 
shock. In this variant of, a lower percentage of “teachers (thirty percent) administered shocks all 
the way up to the maximum. In other variants, where the “learner” was around a corner or in a 
different room, a higher proportion of “teachers” administered maximum shocks than in the 
baseline experiment.  
Jensen (1993, pp. 862-3) observes in his Presidential Address to the American Finance 
Association: “The problems with corporate internal control systems start with the board of 
directors. The board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the final responsibility for the 
functioning of the firm. Most importantly, it sets the rules of the game for the CEO. The job of 
the board is to hire, fire, and compensate the CEO, and to provide high-level counsel. Few boards 
in the past decades have done this job well in the absence of external crisis. This is particularly 
unfortunate given that the very purpose of the internal control mechanism is to provide an early 
warning system to put the organization on track before difficulties reach a crisis stage. The 
reasons for the failure of the board are not completely understood ….”  
The Milgram results, applied to boardrooms, suggest directors obtain positive feelings 
from acts of loyalty to a proximate CEO perceived as a “leader”. This reflexive obedience to 
authority is a plausible answer to Jensen’s (1993) puzzlement about why boards work so poorly 
so often. But given this, what reforms make sense to improve the functioning of boards? 
 
Dissenting Peers and Conflicting Authorities  
If the failure of the board is a consequence of fundamental aspects of human behavior revealed by 
the Milgram experiments, further knowledge about these aspects of human nature may hold keys 
to successful reform. Fortunately, Milgram performed many variations of his basic experiment. 
  Most of the variations Milgram performed, such as using women instead of men, 
adjusting the proximity of the “teacher” and the “learner”, and so on, had at most only moderate  11
effects on his results. However, two specific alternatives generated starkly different behavior on 
the part of the “teachers”.  
One of these features three “teachers” – one reads the question aloud, the second 
indicates if the answer was correct, and the third (the actual subject) throws the switch to initiate 
the shock. At 150 volts, the first “teacher” objects and walks out. The psychologist tells the 
subject to ask the questions and throw the electric switches. At 210 volts, the second “teacher” 
also refuses to continue. The psychologist then tells the subject to go on alone. The fraction of 
real subjects who continued administering shocks fell off sharply when these “dissenting peers” 
began voicing concerns. Milgram (1974, p. 118) notes that “The effects of peer rebellion are very 
impressive in undercutting the experimenter’s authority.” Figure 4 illustrates.  
 
Figure 4. Obedience Rates, Dissenting Peers Variant  
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents directing electric shocks through perfect 












15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210 225 240 255 270 285 300 315 330 345 360 375 390 405 420 435 450














Source: Milgram (1974).  
 
  12
Merely hearing someone else voice objections appears to be enough, in some cases at least, to 
overcome the human instinct of loyalty to legitimate authority.  
Another variant led to a complete cessation of obedience halfway through the experiment. 
As in the baseline experiment of Figure 2, it featured only one “teacher”. However, it now 
included two supervising psychologists “of approximately the same age and height.” At one 
hundred and fifty volts, one began a scripted argument that higher voltage was unnecessary, while 
the other argued for continuing the experiment to its end (p. 105). Confronted with discordant 
authority figures, the “teachers” sided with the psychologist who proposed ending the experiment 
in every case. Milgram (1974, p. 107) notes that “Not a single subject ‘took advantage’ of the 
opportunity to continue the shocks, and that “action was stopped dead in its tracks.” Figure 5 
summarizes.  
Figure 5. Obedience Rates, Disagreeing Authority Figures Variant  
Fraction of ordinary Connecticut residents directing electric shocks through perfect 
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Source: Milgram (1974).   13
Disputes between rival authority figures seem to undermine our willingness to obey 
authority and revitalize our willingness to weigh alternatives rationally and ethically. Authorities 
in conflict seem to evoke independent thought.  
In further variants of this experiment, when Milgram (1974, p. 62) removed the 
experimenter from the lab, and had the “teacher” and “learner” receive instructions over a 
telephone, obedience dropped to about one third of the baseline level. Also, several subjects who 
continued administering shocks surreptitiously delivered lower voltage shocks that their 
instructions required. Some subjects actually assured the experimenter that they were delivering 
the shock levels required when they in fact were not. If the experimenter reentered the lab, this 
behavior ended and subjects resumed compliance. Milgram concluded that “[s]ubjects seemed 
able to resist the experimenter far better when they did not have to confront him face to face. … 
The physical presence of an authority figure was an important force.”  
 
Encouraging Disobedience on Boards 
In variants of his experiments where Milgram arranged for “peers” to question the 
appropriateness of the experiment, obedience fell sharply. This suggests that independent 
directors, whose careers are not controlled by the CEO, might break the CEO’s spell and permit a 
degree of disobedience by all the directors. Consistent with this, corporate governance reforms 
often strive to increase the number of independent directors on listed company boards or on key 
board committees. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act requires U.S. board to contain enough 
independent directors to staff key committees and the Higgs Report recommends that half of all 
U.K. directors be independent.  
  Independent directors seem to effect at least some governance pressure. Weisbach (1988) 
shows more CEO turnover after poor firm performance in firms with more independent directors; 
and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that share prices rise on news of outsiders joining boards.  14
These results accord with independent directors playing the dissenting peers in Figure 4. However, 
a clear empirical link between independent directors and long-term firm performance remains 
elusive (Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
  The variants of the Milgram experiment where obedience fell to zero involved rival 
experimenters, one pushing for continuation of the shocks and the other demanding that they stop. 
Consistent with this logic, the Higgs Report on corporate governance in the United Kingdom 
recommends that all boards have non-executive chairs and designate senior independent directors. 
That is, an independent director must chair the board and another must coordinate the activity of 
the other independent directors. Hopefully, either or both might serve as a rival authority figure to 
the CEO should the need arise.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show that CEOs who simultaneously serve as CEO, 
president and chairman of the board are less likely than other CEOs to be replaced following poor 
firm performance. This is consistent with directors rationally evaluate CEO’s performance where 
rival authority figures exist, but obeying corporate czars holding three titles. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between rival authority figures and long-term performance is again unclear.  
Variants of the Milgram experiment that removed the experimenter further from the 
“teacher’s” immediate presence decreased obedience. This justifies provisions like that in the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act requiring audit committees solely of independent directors. By removing the 
CEO from these meetings, the reforms might induce greater disobedience and a more objective 
assessment of the company’s financial state and future.  
  The Milgram experiments suggest that independent directors (like dissenting peers), non-
executive chairs and lead independent directors (like arguing experimenters), and committees 
containing only independent directors (like subjects whose experimenter left the lab) ought to 
help free boards of reflexive obedience and stimulate rational debate (Herman, 1981; Mace, 1986; 
Wade et al. 1990). Yet conclusive evidence that long term performance is correlated with such 
governance structures remains elusive.   15
  One possible reason is that independent directors have not been common until very 
recently. For example, directors labeled independent might still represent the firm’s lawyers, 
advertising agency, suppliers, or customers. These directors, though not personally financially 
tied to the firm or the CEO, represent interests with such ties.  
More recent reforms stress more clearly the need for genuine independence. Thus, the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2003 defines an independent director as “not receiving, other than for 
service on the board, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and as 
not being an affiliated person of the issuer, or any subsidiary thereof.” The Higgs report in the 
United Kingdom goes further, excluding people with “any material business relationship” with 
the company. Family ties, previous employment, and ties with major shareholders also preclude 
independence. These definitions may still be too loose. But perhaps, as genuinely independent 
directors become more common, a clear performance advantage will emerge.  
  A second possibility is that the Milgram experiments, though clearly relevant to corporate 
governance problems, are an incomplete guide to policy makers. Other behavioral responses may 
also come into play. These responses, like those found by Milgram, probably also result from 
evolutionary pressure favoring early human societies that could work better in groups. However, 
they can become dysfunctional in corporate board rooms, where they reinforce the directors’ 
inclination to conform.  
Corporate insiders who also serve as directors owe their careers and compensation 
packages to the CEO. Axelrod (1984) shows that humans reflexively repay favors.
5 Consequently, 
insider directors are unlikely to oppose the CEO, even if she is patently wrong. Festinger (1957) 
finds that people’s ethical standards are often swayed by their self-interest. Consequently, insider 
directors are likely to come to see their support for their CEO as highly ethically motivated.  
                                                           
5 Such reflexive behavior is appreciated by students of marketing, such as Cialdini (1998), and motivates 
free samples and “no obligation” gifts as sales strategies.   16
Many independent directors are still beholden to the firm’s CEO. Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) find that boards contain fewer independent directors where CEOs control the 
nominating process, and that nominally independent directors in such firms often have financial 
ties to the CEO or the firm. It would be surprising if such financial ties did not affect these 
directors’ judgment. And even directors with no such financial or other ties surely feel a sense of 
obligation to the CEO who appointed them, and a reflexive need to repay the favor. Even 
allegedly independent directors may find it hard to oppose the CEO and devise ethical 
justifications for their subservience.  
One solution is to mandate that future independent directors be nominated by current 
independent directors. Another is to let institutional investors or public shareholders nominate 
directors. Both options have obvious drawbacks. If current independent directors are not really 
independent, they will appoint more of their own kind. Institutional investors may develop 
governance problems of their own. And public shareholders may be swayed by fads or famous 
names.  
But even a substantial number of genuinely independent directors might not be sufficient 
to undermine the CEO’s dominance. Asch (1951) shows that people tend to go along with a 
“group consensus” – even one rigged to be obviously wrong. Kahneman and Tversky (2000) 
summarize a large literature that shows people’s decisions depend critically on how their options 
are “framed”.
6 Even truly independent directors may feel a need to conform to a group consensus. 
The CEO sets the agenda for board meetings, and therefore can control how issues are “framed” 
to guide the formation of such a consensus - even in boards nominally dominated by genuinely 
independent directors.  
The Higgs Report requires that the CEO not chair board meetings. These reforms seek to 
let an alternative authority figure frame issues. Again, such measures have costs. Entrusting too 
                                                           
6 This knowledge is used by, for example, professional pollsters to generate answers that lend the aura of 
popular support to causes advanced by their clients. See Cialdini (1998).   17
much control to an outsider could deprive the board of experience and knowledge. Moreover, 
Adams et al. (2005) argue that the CEO can manipulate agendas to frame issues most easily if she 
is the only insider on the board, and that boards entirely composed of independent directors 
actually strengthen the CEO’s power. Ocasio (1994) argues that other corporate insiders on 
boards can emerge as alternative “leaders” if they feel they can usurp the CEO’s position.  
  Overall, the structure of corporate boards creates strong pressures on directors to fall into 
line behind the CEO. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that directors seek to build 
reputations as effective monitors. However, such reputations may not be the key to successful 
careers as directors. A reputation as a “loose cannon” or a “troublemaker” may be a bigger 
impediment than a reputation as a “yes man” (Mace, 1971; Westphal and Stern, 2006, 2007).  
 
Alternative Explanations 
It is tempting to argue obedient directors and dominant CEOs must be an economically efficient 
outcome since this configuration is observed so consistently. If more constraints on CEOs were 
really economically sensible, would firms that found ways to impose such constraints not have 
flourished and grown to dominate the economy?  
  A rational agent explanation of Milgram’s findings might derive from information 
cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992), which occur when people 
rationally imitate a player who has already paid to become informed, rather than pay to become 
informed themselves. Thus, we presume more crowded restaurants have better food, and praise 
oeuvres of already lauded modern artists. From this perspective, Milgram’s subjects initially 
assume the experimenter is informed and rationally opt not to pay the mental cost of thinking 
about what they are doing. When a second credibly informed experimenter voices dissent, the 
subjects opt to think and conclude their actions are irrational.   18
  Experimental studies show that information cascades can form in simple games 
(Anderson and Holt, 1997). The application of these findings in actual financial decision-making 
is unclear. While Drehmann et al. (2002) find experts at an international consulting firm as prone 
to information cascades as ordinary experimental subjects, Alevy et al. (2007) report options 
traders markedly less prone to information cascades than students, the typical subjects of 
experimental economic studies.  
  The plausibility of information cascades in finance is bolstered by their acceptance in 
other branches of economics. Long-term unemployment results if employers rely on applicants’ 
work histories, as opposed to gathering their own information (Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2003). 
Information cascades explain artistic success (Crossland and Smith, 2002) as well as runaway box 
office hits and flops in motion pictures (De Vany and Walls, 1996; though see also De Vany and 
Lee, 2001).  
  In finance, Amihud et al. (2003) show that Israeli IPOs are bimodal – either massively 
oversubscribed or pitifully undersubscribed – and propose information cascades to explain this. 
Rao et al. (2001) argue that information cascades explain financial analysts’ decisions to initiate 
and discontinue coverage of particular stocks. The latter is perhaps consistent with Gul and 
Lundholm (1995), who extend information cascade models to allow endogenous timing of 
decisions, and predict waves of similar decisions, as agents strive to free-ride on fresh 
information.  
  Intriguingly, though information cascades might provide a rational agent explanation for 
the Milgram experiment, various studies propose that behavioral biases persist to damp 
information cascades. Thus, Noth and Weber (2003) propose that individually irrational 
overconfidence, by inducing agents to rely on their own judgment, deters information cascades. 
Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) observe experimental subjects overpaying for signals, and suggest 
that this apparently irrational behavior might persist because it likewise damps information  19
cascades. Arya et al. (2006) propose that noise in the information transmission process may be 
desirable because it can interrupt information cascades.  
  Thus, some mixture of rational and behavioral phenomena might explain Milgram’s 
findings and the concordant issue of excessive loyalty in corporate boardrooms. However, there 
are several grounds for precluding information cascades as a complete explanation. 
 First,  Martin  et al. (1976) describe a modified Milgram experiment in which subjects in a 
boys’ secondary school were directed to a set fake noise generator to a level indicating that they 
were exposing themselves to “a 50% risk” of hearing damage. The close similarity of their 
findings to Milgram’s implies obedience is not socialized aggression. Rationality seems 
implausible if the subjects truly believed were risking their own hearing. An innate and 
unthinking obedience reflex seems more consistent with this behavior.  
  Furthermore, Milgram’s subjects stressed feelings of ‘loyalty’ and ‘duty’ in their ex-post 
debriefings; as well as respect for the experimenter’s professional qualifications, which might 
proxy for superior information about the value of the experiment. This suggests behavioral 
motives in play.  
Also, parallel work in political science by Janis (1972) attributes various political 
disasters – Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and America’s 
misadventures in Korea and Vietnam – to groupthink, defined as a psychological predisposition 
to conform to group expectations. While each of these fiascos might be attributed to an 
information cascade, detailed post-mortems expose clear psychological underpinnings. 
Independently of Milgram, Janis proposes a psychological urge to conform and speculates that it 
might be mitigated if groups assign members roles as critical evaluators, group leaders remain 
impartial, and multiple groups analyze issues independently. Surowiecki (2004) develops these 
concepts further, arguing that independence and freely voiced dissent let groups make superior 
decisions while the suppression of dissent induces groupthink.   20
  Finally, de Waal (2005) describes apes as organized into hierarchical social structures 
under alpha males (e.g. chimpanzees) or alpha females (e.g. bonobos), who command the 
obedience of other apes in the troop. Primates, including early hominids, who obey their alpha 
males (or females) might well survive better than those who pause to calculate the rational 
response to a charging mastodon. Thus, an obedience reflex, like other decision-making short cuts 
that seem irrational a priori, might contribute to individual or group survival.
7 Evolutionary 
group selection can induce seemingly irrational individual behavioral biases (Bernardo and 
Welch, 2001), and ape parallels to human hierarchies are certainly consistent with Milgram’s 
thesis of a biologically-based ‘agency’ instinct for loyalty.  
  Returning to corporate governance, obedience in corporate boardrooms might thus reflect 
behavioral biases, rational information cascades, or some interaction of the two. Regardless, 
popular attention to recent corporate governance scandals is inducing major institutional reforms 
aimed at altering the dynamics of board decision-making. Adams et al. (2005) show that powerful 
CEOs raise the variance in firm performance: some firms with powerful CEOs do much better 
than firms with constrained CEOs, others do much worse. Simply constraining the CEO thus 
probably confers no clear advantage. Good corporate governance requires constraints that fall 
into place when the CEO is making an obvious mistake, but not when he is enacting a visionary 
strategy. In practice, this distinction may be difficult for independent observers to draw. We are 
now engaged in economy-wide experiments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere to see if various regulatory reforms can induce such discriminating constraints. 
 
                                                           
7 Shiller (1995) speculates, based on the anthropology literature, that compliance and herding echo social conventions 
of polite conversation that enhance group survival odds. Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that such aspects of 
conversational politeness are standard across cultures, and that real tolerance of dissent requires effort and challenges 
human nature.   21
The Ethics of Corporate Governance 
Much popular discussion of corporate governance problems has a distinct moral tone. Corporate 
governance scandals are “ethical failures.” Milgram (1974, p. 7) found that “people … asked to 
render a moral judgment on what constitutes appropriate behavior in [his experiments] unfailingly 
see disobedience as proper.” Asked why they behaved inappropriately, his subjects advanced 
excuses like politeness, keeping a promise, the awkwardness of disagreement, absorption in 
technical details of the experiment, or a belief that a greater good, like the advancement science, 
must justify the learner’s pain. But the most universal response was a sense of loyalty to the 
experimenter. Milgram (1974, p. 8) concludes that his typical subject did not lose his moral sense; 
“Instead, it acquires a radically different focus. He does not respond with a moral sentiment to the 
actions he performs, Rather, his moral concern now shifts to a consideration of how well he is 
living up to the expectations that the authority has of him.”  
  Milgram (1974) posits what he calls an agentic shift, whereby individuals forsake rational 
reasoning for loyalty. Milgram (1974, p. 145-6) states “The most far-reaching consequence of the 
agentic shift is that a man feels responsibility to the authority directing him, but feels no 
responsibility for the content of the actions that the authority prescribes.” Directors enchanted by 
a powerful CEO feel a profound duty to live up to the CEO’s expectations, but none at all for how 
their actions affect shareholders, or other stakeholders for that matter.  
  Human nature changes slowly, if at all; and terms like loyalty and duty are laden with 
moral charge. Milgram (1974, p. 188) despairs that “The virtues of loyalty, discipline, and self-
sacrifice that we value so highly in the individual are the very properties that create destructive 
engines of war and bind men to malevolent systems of authority.” Corporate governance scandals 
seem anticlimactic to this, but arise from the same weakness in human nature.  
One hope whenever behavioral biases induce irrational or unethical behavior is that 
informing people about those biases can help them correct their errors and induce appropriate  22
behavior. Gergen (1973, p. 313) argues in this vein that “sophistication as to psychological 
principles liberates one from their behavioral implications.” The Milgram experiments were 
highly publicized in the 1960s and 1970s, yet Schurz (1985) find no time trend in the findings of 
numerous subsequent studies replicating Milgram’s results. Proponents of education as liberation 
from behavioral influences may underestimate the difficulty of this task. Still, university ethics 
committees ended Milgram experiments in the 1980s, so longer trend estimates are unavailable. 
Corporate governance reforms and director education programs are now providing a natural 
experiment that holds the promise of greatly advancing our understanding of these issues. 
 
Agency Problems Revisited 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) correctly argue that corporate governance problems often involve 
corporate insiders failing to act as agents of the firm’s shareholders and other providers of capital. 
This view derives from the agency problem model of Jensen and Meckling (1976), in which 
corporate officers and directors have a duty as agents of shareholders, but act for themselves.  
The phenomenon observed by Milgram (1974) is also a kind of agency problem. Indeed, 
Milgram dubs instinctive excessive obedience to legitimate authority agentic behavior. But here, 
the problem is individuals who ought to think and act for themselves instead serving as faithful 
agents. Thus, it may be sensible to conceive of two types of agency problem.  
Definitions   A type I agency problem occurs if an individual acts for herself when social 
welfare would be higher if she acted as an agent.  
 A  type II agency problem occurs if an individual acts as an agent when social 
welfare would be higher if she acted for herself. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the agency problem literature in economics and finance, are 
concerned with type I agency problems. Milgram (1974) and the related social psychology 
literature are concerned with type II agency problems.   23
In corporate governance, both sorts of agency problems occur. A type I agency problem 
occurs because top managers fail to act as faithful agents of the public shareholders, and follow 
their own unrestricted self-interest instead. But a type II agency problem also occurs when a 
director, who shares little in the CEO’s excesses, nonetheless fall into line as his obedient agent. 
Improving corporate governance requires institutional changes that deal with both types of 
agency problem.  
 
Institutions to Balance Twin Agency Problems 
More generally, both types of agency problem occur throughout the economy and society. 
Individuals can err either by acting for themselves when they should act as agents of others, or by 
acting as agents when they should be thinking for themselves. Soldiers who pilfer from army 
stores constitute a type I agency problem; soldiers who fire on civilians when ordered to 
constitute a type II agency problem. Bureaucrats who waste taxpayers’ money on pet projects are 
a type I agency problem; bureaucrats who obey their superiors to enforce patently foolish rules 
are a type II agency problem. Judges who misuse their offices to extract bribes are a type I agency 
problem; judges who rigidly enforce legalistic absurdities are a type II agency problem.  
The balance of type I against type II agency problems probably affects institutional 
development in fairly basic ways. An early example is the Holy Office of the Devil’s Advocate, 
a.k.a. the Promoter of the Faith, established by Pope Sixtus V in 1587.  This early 
Counterreformation reform aimed to cleanse the Roman Church by vetting the character and 
miraculous credibility of sainthood candidates to stop powerful individuals from canonizing their 
friends and relatives.  The office was only abolished by John Paul II in 1983, who then canonized 
five time more saints than all other 20
th century popes together.    
A balancing of the dual agency problems also pervades legal and political institutions in 
the modern world.  For example, the Common Law charges judges with interpreting general legal  24
principles. This avoids making judges excessively obedient to political authorities, a type II 
agency problem, but some judges might abuse this power, a type I problem. French Civil Law, in 
contrast, requires judges to administer minutely detailed regulations, avoiding the type I problem, 
but inducing a vulnerability to type II problems. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that France’s 
more tumultuous early history exposed judges to bribes and threats by powerful litigants, 
escalated type I agency problems, wherein judges abandoned their duty to the people and ruled to 
accumulate private wealth. In Britain, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that judges were less 
subject to such pressures, and could therefore be trusted with more discretion. That is, the danger 
of type I agency problems in the judiciary was less, so institutions evolved to better limit type II 
agency problems.  
A common theme, used across many different types of institutions to limit excessive 
obedience, is to create a formal and powerful official whose duty to criticize those, presumably to 
act as Milgram’s rival authority figure and provoke the dramatic disruption of type II agency 
costs evident in Figure 5. Thus, Common Law courts employ the so-called Adversary System, 
pitting two lawyers against each other, charging each with an active duty to undermine the case 
advanced by the other.  This was explicitly designed to limit judges’ ability to manipulate the 
course of trails (Hostettler, 2006).   
The Westminster model of parliamentary democracy likewise charges a Leader of the 
Official Opposition with the explicit duty of persistently criticizing the party power. This position 
evolved slowly after the Glorious Revolution as a way to limit first the power of the Kings and 
then the power of elected Prime Ministers (Fourd, 1964).  Leaders of the Opposition were 
charged with disloyalty for voicing criticism of flawed policies with steadily falling frequency as  
the utility of open debate to good policy making ultimately won out – though a prestigious post 
for the loser in parliamentary elections no doubt also had its supporters. 
Even in academia, we find appointed critics who are judged by their efficacy in finding 
mistakes in others’ works – especially since the mid 20
th century.  Each speaker at an academic  25
conference must usually endure a subsequent ten minute critique by a discussant – another 
academic charged by the conference organizers with highlighting any and all the speaker’s errors.  
Researchers seeking to publish their research must subject their work to the merciless criticism of 
anonymous academic referees, whose explicit duty is to expose errors in the research.  Work 
unable to pass this test is generally not accepted as valid by other researchers. It be no 
coincidence that the pace of scientific progress hastened markedly after the mid-twentieth century 
when these procedures became institutionalized. Exploring how institutions develop and evolve 
to balance these twin agency problems in all manner of settings is an exciting avenue for future 
research. 
The Law, government, and academia all developed institutions to check excessively 
zealous obedience to authority.  This took centuries, even millennia, and we still have an 
occasional Guantanamo Bay established in the name of patriotism, an occasional Robert Mugabe 
running an economy into the ground amid cheering sycophants, and an occasional bogus stem 
cell paper by an eminent scientific authority. Eliminating all type II agency costs is most likely 
impossible, so a tradeoff emerges.  Devoting sufficient resources to challenge every decision 
made is surely impossibly costly, so a degree of excessive loyalty persists, though we sometimes 
try to punish the overly loyal ex post.  Hence, the disgrace, prosecutions, and financial ruin 
afforded soldiers who obey “illegal” orders, lackeys of ousted dictators, coauthors of disgraced 
scientists, and – of course – directors of Enron, WorldCom, and Hollinger.    
This promise of a better balance seems especially great in corporate governance research.  
Arguably, no other career offers an aspiring leader the vast freedom of action entrusted to a 
corporate tycoon.  Economists and psychologists are slowly groping towards better institutional 
arrangements for corporate governance that would disrupt excessively “agentic” behavior more 
effectively in corporations, yet not impose excessive costs on the economy or the individuals 
involved. In the aftermath of a spate of corporate governance scandals in the early 1930s, the 
United States passed the Securities and Exchanges Act mandating external audits of listed firms  26
and created the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce it.  The New Deal architects of 
these reforms hoped sophisticated and powerful accounting firms would stand up to even the 
most mesmerizing of corporate leaders, but Arthur Anderson proved otherwise. Genuinely 
independent directors, lead independent directors, non-executive chairs, and the like are all 
alternative proposals for forcing open debate into boardrooms.  
A consensus seems to be emerging that top corporate decision makers, like CEOs and 
controlling shareholders, need some analog to a Leader of the Official Opposition in Parliament 
or an academic discussant at an American Economic Association conference.  At present, the 
form this analog will ultimately take is unclear, for which arrangements most effectively check 
excessively agentic behavior while imposing the least drag on economic activity remain 
ambiguous. Sarbanes-Oxley may well be too expensive, as its opponents charge (Leuz et al. 2007; 
Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Zhang, 2007; and others), and may soon be undone by a rising call 
for deregulation (Romano, 2005).
8  A better balance may emerge from Britain’s self-regulation 
initiatives (Back and Coffee, 1994).  Or we may wait for the next bout of corporate scandals to 
trigger entirely new reforms.     
 
Conclusions 
Behavioral issues are important in corporate governance. Milgram’s (1974) experiments in social 
psychology show that human nature includes a reflexive subservience to people perceived to be 
legitimate authorities, like corporate chief executive officers. This reflex disposes directors to fall 
into line behind their CEO. Because it connects to morally charged concepts like loyalty, trust, 
and duty, this subservience is difficult to overcome. Its moral overtone also lets people behave in 
overtly unethical ways, yet justify their behavior in terms of these charged concepts. This is 
consistent with directors justifying their acquiescence to obviously flawed corporate strategies in 
                                                           
8 Though see Leuz (2007).  27
terms of their loyalty to the CEO, his trust in them, and their duty to him. Other behavioral factors, 
such as cognitive dissonance, reciprocal favor trading, and group conformity, may significantly 
reinforce this subservience.  
  Effective corporate governance reforms must weaken this reflexive subservience. 
Milgram reports that dissenting peers, rival authorities, and absent authorities shook this 
subservience and reinitiated subjects’ own reasoning. Corporate governance reforms that envision 
independent directors (dissenting peers), non-executive chairs (alternative authority figures), and 
fully independent audit committees (absent authority figures) aspire to a similar effect on 
corporate boards – the initiation of real debate to expose poor strategies before they become fatal. 
In this vein, the United Kingdom’s Higgs Report suggests that boards have “non-executive” 
chairs, and the Sarbanes Oxley reforms in the United States mandate audit committees composed 
solely of “independent” directors.  
  Given Milgram’s (1974) findings in social psychology and the large subsequent literature 
replicating them, the paucity of empirical evidence in the finance and economics literatures 
connecting such governance structures to corporate performance is puzzling.
9 We suggest two 
plausible reasons.  
One reason is that genuinely independent directors have been rarer than corporate proxy 
statements would suggest - at least until very recently. Many directors classified as independent 
are actually associated with the CEO. The Higgs report notes that roughly half of the British 
directors classified as independent are recruited by the CEO through personal contacts or 
friendships. As more stringent definitions of independence are applied, a clearer relationship with 
firm performance may emerge. 
Another reason is that overcoming Milgram’s (1974) reflexive subservience may actually 
be quite difficult, especially if this behavior is reinforced by other innate behavioral responses. If 
so, genuinely independent directors and board chairs may require having institutional investors  28
and public shareholders to nominate candidates for directorships. Such measures also entail other 
corporate governance risks, for they assume good governance within institutional investors and 
shareholder rationality.
10 However, continuing corporate governance scandals over the years and 
throughout the world suggest that serious consideration be given to such reforms as ways of 
infusing more open debate and overt criticism of CEOs into corporate board meetings.  
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